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FOSTER V. CARSON: THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIES
THE CAPABLE-OF-REPETITION-YET-EVADINGREVIEW EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
AND LENDS A FREE HAND TO BUDGET-CUTTING
STATE OFFICIALS
Joshua C. Gaul
Abstract: In Foster v. Carson, public defender organizations and indigent defendants
sued the chief justice of the Oregon Supreme Court for suspending appointments of indigent
defense counsel. Before the parties could fully litigate the case, the chief justice reinstated
appointments. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the case as moot and held that the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review did not apply. A case falls under that exception
when the party resisting mootness demonstrates that it was not possible to fully litigate the
action before it ceased and there is a reasonable expectation that the party will be subjected to
the same action in the future. Because the court concluded that it was not possible to fully
litigate the case before the chief justice reinstated appointments, applicability of the capableof-repetition-yet-evading-review exception depended only on whether there was a
"reasonable expectation" that the injury would recur. When evaluated in light of U.S.
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the facts in Foster support a finding that there
was a reasonable expectation that the chief justice would again suspend funding for indigent
defense counsel. The public interest in deciding the constitutionality of the chief justice's
action further supports application of the exception.

Thanks to a prolonged economic recession, the escalating cost of
domestic security, and unrelenting pressure not to raise taxes, state
governments face crushing budget deficits. t The states faced a collective
$200 billion shortfall for fiscal years 2001 through 2003.2 As states
struggle to find ways to reduce deficits, state programs and services are
State and local judicial systems
being reduced or altogether eliminated.
4
are not immune to these cuts.
In response to Oregon's severe budget crisis, the Oregon State
Legislature held five special sessions during the second half of 2002 to

I. See John M. Broder, Despite Signs of Economic Recovery, States' Budgets Are Still Reeling,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2004, at A12; Michael Janofsky, Deep Cuts Have Not Closed Deficit in Many
States, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A20.
2. Broder, supra note 1, at At2.
3. See id.; Janofsky, supranote 1, at A20.
4. See Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2003).
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address the budget shortfall.5 During these sessions, the legislature
substantially cut funds available to the Oregon Judicial Department for
its indigent defense counsel programs.6 As a result, the chief justice of
the Oregon Supreme Court, acting in his capacity as the administrative
head of the Oregon Judicial Department, suspended appointments of
indigent defense counsel between March 1, 2003 and June 30, 2003.'
Indigent defendants charged with a variety of crimes 8 were denied
counsel, and their cases were delayed until after June 30. 9
Before the chief justice reinstated funding, a group of indigent
defendants and defense counsel organizations had sued him in Foster v.
Carson.'0 The plaintiffs claimed that the chief justice had violated their
constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection when
he suspended appointments of indigent defense counsel." After the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon had granted defendant's motion
to dismiss, plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.' 2 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot.13
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a number of exceptions to
mootness, including the exception for cases capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review.' 4 For a case to fall under this exception, the party
resisting mootness must demonstrate that the challenged action is too
short in duration to be fully litigated before it ceases and that there is a
reasonable expectation that the party will be subjected to the same action
in the future.' 5 The Foster court held that the exception did not apply
because there was no reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs would
6
again face a suspension of indigent defense counsel appointments.'

5. Id. at 748; see also Appellants' Consolidated Opening Brief at 4-5, Foster(Nos. 03-035457 &
03-035458).
6. Appellants' Consolidated Opening Brief at 4-5.
7. Foster,347 F.3d at 744.
8. Id.; see also infra note 135.
9. Foster, 347 F.3d at 744. This Note does not address the constitutional issues raised by the
Fosterplaintiffs or the plaintiffs' right to speedy trials.
10. 347 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition to the chief justice, the plaintiffs also named the
state court administrator and several Oregon judges as defendants. Id. at 742.
11. Id. at 745.
12. Id. at 749.
13. Id.

14. See infra Part I.A.
15. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
16. Foster,347 F.3d at 748-49.

An Exception to Mootness
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in dismissing the Foster
case as moot. Part I describes the mootness doctrine and details the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception as applied by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. Part II details the facts,
procedural history, and holding of the Foster decision. Part II also
summarizes information submitted to the Foster court by plaintiffs'
counsel about Oregon's ongoing budget crisis. Part III then argues that
under the reasonable expectation standard established by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, the issue in Foster is capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review. Part III also argues that the public interest
in settling the constitutionality of suspending indigent defense counsel
appointments further weighed against holding the case moot. This Note
concludes that the Ninth Circuit should have applied the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception instead of dismissing the case
as moot.
I.

CASES THAT ARE CAPABLE-OF-REPETITION-YETEVADING-REVIEW ARE NOT MOOT

To satisfy the U.S. Constitution's jurisdictional requirements, federal
courts must find both that the parties bringing the action have standing
and that the action either is not moot or fits within one of the exceptions
to the mootness doctrine.1 7 Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is
the proper party to bring the case before a federal court for
adjudication.' 8 To determine whether a case is moot, a court asks
whether the "issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome." 19 For example, a case will
become moot if an essential party dies during the appeals process 20 or if
a student challenging a school policy graduates from the school.2 '
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated four exceptions to the
mootness doctrine.22 One of these exceptions is that the action is
17. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.5.1, at 60 (2d
ed. 2002).
19. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (quoting County of Los Angeles v.
Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted).
20. Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976).
21. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975) (finding that students'
constitutional challenge of rules governing the student newspaper became moot when all of the
plaintiff students graduated).
22. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, §§ 2.7.2-.5, at114-27.
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capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review. 23 To establish that a case falls
into the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception, the party
resisting mootness must first demonstrate that it is not possible to fully
litigate the challenged action before it ceases. 4 Next, the party must
show that there is a reasonable expectation that it will be subjected to the
challenged action in the future.25 U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
cases applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception
establish what constitutes a "reasonable expectation., 26 Federal courts do
not recognize an exception to mootness for cases involving a strong
public interest. 27 However, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit have held that a strong public interest in settling the legality of an
action may weigh against a holding of mootness 8
A.

U.S. Supreme Court PrecedentEstablishesa Flexible Doctrine of
Mootness

Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to "cases and controversies. 29 Cases and controversies consist of
active disputes between two or more adversarial parties. 30 Limiting
courts to resolving only live disputes helps to ensure that the judicial
branch does not intrude upon the legislative and executive branches of
the federal government. 3 1 To maintain their case or controversy, all
parties must retain a personal stake in the litigation throughout all its
stages.32
Courts have developed the related doctrines of standing and mootness
to determine whether the issue being litigated presents a case or

23. Id. § 2.7.3, at 117.
24. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
25. Id.
26. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-20 (1988); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982);
Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
27. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974).
28. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 643-44 (1979); United States v. W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Armster v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of
Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
30. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980).
31. Id.
32. See Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).

An Exception to Mootness

controversy. 33 The doctrines' common nexus in Article III has led the
U.S. Supreme Court to describe mootness as "'standing in a time
frame.' ' 34 The Court has stated that "'[t]he requisite personal interest
that must exist at the commencement of litigation (standing) must
continue throughout its existence (mootness)."' 35 Although the Court has
frequently emphasized the relationship between mootness and standing,
it consistently treats mootness as a more flexible doctrine.3 6
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated four exceptions that allow a
federal court to retain jurisdiction over an otherwise moot case.37 A case
will not be moot when (1) the injured party faces collateral
consequences stemming from the injury; 38 (2) the case is certified as a
class action; 39 (3) one party voluntarily ceases the allegedly illegal
action; 40 or (4) the action at issue is capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview. 41

33. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
There is some debate over whether the mootness doctrine is mandated by Article III. In Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the mootness doctrine does not
derive from Article III:
it is a prudential rule with "an attenuated connection [to Article III] that may
be overridden where there are strong reasons to override. it." Id. at 330-31 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). For a discussion of the constitutional roots of mootness, see generally Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability:The Example ofMootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1992).
34. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397 (quoting Henry Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who
and the When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).
35. Id. The definition of mootness as "standing in a time frame," which has been widely adopted
by the lower courts and legal scholars, has been questioned by the Court. In Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., the Court suggested that the definition is not
comprehensive. 528 U.S. at 190.
36. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400-01; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). There
are circumstances where the likelihood that a defendant will resume the challenged behavior is too
slim to support standing, but would be sufficient to save a case on appeal from dismissal as moot.
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190.
37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, §§ 2.7.2-5, at 114-27.
38. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1998) (outlining the collateral consequence
exception for both civil and criminal cases).
39. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1975) (holding that a court retains
jurisdiction over a class action suit even if the named party's case has become moot).
40. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189-90 (holding that a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act did not become moot when the permit holder began complying with its permit or when it
shut down the offending facility).
41. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-20 (1988) (holding that a student's challenge of
his suspension was not moot because the student retained the option to re-enroll in a California
school).
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The Capable-of-Repetition-yet-Evading-ReviewException
Requires There To Be a Reasonable Expectation That the Action
Will Recur Rather Than a "DemonstratedProbability" of
Recurrence

The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a two-part test to determine if
a case
falls into the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
42
exception. First, the duration of the action at issue must be too short for
the parties to fully litigate its legality before it ceases.43 Second, there
must be a reasonable expectation that the party challenging the action
will be subjected to the same action again.4 4 Establishing such
reasonable expectation does not require a party to provide a
45
"demonstrated probability" of recurrence.
In Honig v. Doe,46 the Court concluded that establishing a reasonable
expectation that an action will recur does not require a demonstrated
probability of recurrence.4 7 The Honig Court accepted a chain of
probable events leading to the recurrence of the challenged action as
sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation.4 8 In Honig, two
California students, John Doe and Jack Smith, sued the California
superintendent of public instruction after they were expelled from high
school for behavior related to their emotional disabilities. 49 Both
students alleged that their expulsions violated the Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA). 50 After the district court and the Ninth Circuit
had ruled in their favor, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 ' At
oral argument, the United States, appearing as amicus curiae, argued that
the case was moot because Doe was no longer entitled to protection
under the EHA due to his age, and Smith had moved out of the school
district from which he had been expelled.5 2
42. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).

43. Id.
44. Id. Because the Foster court accepted that the suspension of funds for defense counsel was
too short to be fully litigated, this Note focuses only on the court's application of the "reasonable
expectation" requirement. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003).
45. Honig, 484 U.S. at 320 n.6.
46. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
47. Id. at 320 n.6.
48. See id. at 321-23.
49. Id. at 312-16.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 316-17.
52. Id. at 318 nn.5-6.

An Exception to Mootness
The Court held that the case was moot for plaintiff Doe.53 The EHA
only applies to students between the ages of three and twenty-one, and
Doe was twenty-four by the time the Honig case reached the Court. 54
Because the EHA no longer applied to Doe, there was no possibility that
California would again deprive him of his rights under the EHA.55
However, because plaintiff Smith was only twenty when Honig
reached the Court,56 it was possible that California could again deny him
his rights under the EHA. 57 The Court held that the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception applied to Smith 58 because there
was a reasonable expectation that Smith would again be expelled from a
California school. 59 For that to happen, the Court assumed that Smith
would again enroll in a California school (even though he had not stated
that he would do so), be placed in an environment where his behavior
could not be adequately controlled, behave in an aggressive manner
caused by his disability, and be expelled for that behavior.60 Despite
these assumptions, and the fact that Smith was nearly too old for the
EHA to apply to him, the Court concluded that there was 61a reasonable
expectation that a California school would again expel him.
C.

Under Ninth Circuit Precedent,Courts May Find That a
Reasonable Expectation Exists When There Is Some Indication
That the ChallengedAction Will Be Repeated, but Not When
Recurrence of the Action Is "Highly Unlikely" or "Speculative"

The Ninth Circuit has held that a party challenging an action must
demonstrate "some indication that the challenged conduct will be
repeated" in order to satisfy the reasonable expectation requirement of
the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception.62 Like the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit does not require a demonstrated

53. Id.
at318.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 320-23.
58. Id.
at323.
59. Id. at 319-20.
60. See id. at 320-23.
61. Id. at 323.
62. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. United States Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1999).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:665, 2004

probability of recurrence.63 The Ninth Circuit will not, however, apply
the exception when repetition of the challenged action is "highly
unlikely'' 64 or "too speculative to prevent mootness. 65 Determining
whether a case has become moot, , 66often involves a "'highly
individualistic ... appraisal of the facts.
The Ninth Circuit has established a low threshold for demonstrating a
reasonable expectation that a challenged action will recur. That
standard is met when the party challenging the action establishes "some
indication" that the action will be repeated.68 For example, in Miller ex
rel. NLRB v. CaliforniaPacific Medical Center,6 9 the court applied the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Honig that the complaining party
,"need not show that there is a "demonstrated probability" that the
dispute will recur."' 70 In Miller, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) sought a preliminary injunction to restore the collective
bargaining status of the California Nurses Association (CNA) with the
California Pacific Medical Center (CPMC) pending resolution of an
unfair labor charge. 7' CNA lost its collective bargaining status during the
merger of two other hospitals into CPMC.72 Prior to an en banc
rehearing, the NLRB issued its final decision on the underlying unfair
labor charge, which rendered the preliminary injunction unnecessary.73
Because CPMC continued to undergo restructuring and because it held
contracts with five other unions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there
was a reasonable expectation that the NLRB would again seek injunctive
relief against CPMC in an unfair labor proceeding.74

63. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1520 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Honig).
64. Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 183 F.3d
949, 953 (9th Cir. 1999); Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998).
65. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. Alaska Or., 189 F.3d at 856 (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533 (2d ed. 1984)).
67. See Barilla,886 F.2d at 1520.
68. Alaska Or., 189 F.3d at 856.
69. 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
70. Id. at 454 (quoting Barilla,886 F.2d at 1520 (discussing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S 305 (1988))).
71. Id. at 451.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 453.
74. Id. at 454.

An Exception to Mootness
The Ninth Circuit will not apply the exception when a recurrence of
the challenged action is "highly unlikely ' 75 or "speculative. ' 76 In
Mayfield v. Dalton,7 7 the court noted that "'speculative contingencies
afford no basis for.., passing on the substantive issues' of a case.78
The plaintiffs, two marines, challenged the constitutionality of a
Department of Defense (DOD) policy requiring tissues sample for DNA
analysis from all members of the armed services. 79 By the time the case
reached the Ninth Circuit, both plaintiffs had left active duty, allowing
the DOD to argue that the case had become moot. 80 The marines
countered that their case was not moot because they were subject to
recall to active duty in the event of a national emergency. 8 I The Mayfield
court held that the case was moot because there was no reasonable
expectation that the marines would again have to submit DNA
samples. 82 The marines' recall to active duty "could happen only at some
indefinite time in the future and then only upon the occurrence of future
events now unforeseeable. ' 83 In addition, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that several changes made by the DOD to its DNA sampling program
after the plaintiffs had brought suit had "materially alter[ed] many
aspects of the policy that [the marines] challenged" and rendered it
unlikely that they 84would again be subjected to the challenged DNA
sampling program.
Similarly, in Dufresne v. Veneman, 85 the Ninth Circuit held that the
case was moot after concluding that the recurrence of the challenged

75. Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 183 F.3d
949, 953 (9th Cir. 1999); Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998).
76. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1995).
77. 109 F.3d 1423 (1997).
78. Id. at 1425 (quoting Preiser v. Newkird, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396
U.S. 45,49 (1969) (internal quotations omitted))).
79. Id. at 1424. The plaintiffs argued that the lack of safeguards guaranteeing privacy of DNA
donors violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. The plaintiffs also feared that genetic information obtained from the samples would be used to
discriminate against applicants for insurance, benefit programs, or jobs. Id.
80. Id. at 1425.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1426.
83. Id. at 1425.
84. Id. at 1425-26. The changes included shortening the retention period of samples and
implementing a mechanism for service members to request destruction of their DNA samples upon
separation from the military. Id.
85. 114 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1997).
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action was "too remote to preserve a live case or controversy."8 6 Valerie
Dufresne alleged that California's use of chemical pesticides against
Mediterranean fruit flies exacerbated her Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.87
She sued several federal and California officials to enjoin the spraying of
pesticides to combat future fruit fly infestations. Before the Dufresne
case reached the Ninth Circuit, California agriculture officials reported
to the court that they had eradicated the fruit fly by using sterile
insects, 9 and that they had found no live fruit flies in California since
1995.90 California officials anticipated that any future outbreak would
also be combated with sterile insects. 9 1 Based on the eradication of the
fruit fly and the new, pesticide-free method of combating
future
92
infestations, the Dufresne court held that the case was moot.
D.

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth CircuitAllow the
PublicInterest to Weigh Against Mootness in Determiningthe
Legality of an Action

Federal courts do not recognize a general exception to mootness for
cases with a continuing public interest. 93 However, the public interest in
having the legality of an issue settled will weigh against mootness
provided the case satisfies one of the recognized exceptions to
mootness. 94 The U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
considered the public interest in cases applying both the capable-of-

86. Id. at 955.
87. Id. at 954. A support group for sufferers from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome joined Dufresne's
suit as plaintiffs. Id. at 952.
88. Id. at 954. Dufresne initially sought monetary damages, but dropped that claim before the
case reached Ninth Circuit. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 955.
93. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). Some state courts explicitly recognize
an exception to mootness for public interest. See, e.g., Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 1324 v.
City of Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Alaska 2002) (recognizing the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine in Alaska); Hart v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 111 Wash. 2d 445, 44751, 759 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (1988) (outlining the extensive use of the public interest exception to
mootness in Washington).
94. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 643-44 (1979); United States v. W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).

An Exception to Mootness
repetition-yet-evading-review and voluntary cessation exceptions to
mootness. 95
Throughout the U.S. Supreme Court's development of the exceptions
to mootness, the Court has also considered the public interest in settling
the legality of a challenged action.96 In Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.
ICC, 97 the Court applied the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
exception for the first time and considered the public's interest in
settling the legality of a two-year order issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). 98 Although the order had expired before
the case reached the Court, the Court refused to dismiss the case as moot
because review of the ICC "ought not to be ...defeated, by short-term
orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review." 99 The Southern
Pacific Court went on to quote Boise City Irrigation and Land Co. v.
Clark,100 a Ninth Circuit mootness decision, to support its proposition
that the case was not moot.' 0' The Boise City court considered the
"propriety of deciding some question of law presented which might
serve to guide
the municipal body when again called upon to act in the
02
matter."'
In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 0 3 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the voluntary cessation exception,' 04 "together with a public interest
in having the legality of the practices settled, militate[d] against a

95. See W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632 (applying the voluntary cessation exception); S. Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515-16 (1911) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994)
(applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception); Armster v. United States Dist.
Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the voluntary
cessation exception to mootness).
96. See S.Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 515-16.
97. 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
98. Id. at 515-16.
99. Id. at 514-15.
100. 131 F. 415 (9th Cir. 1904). In Boise City, the court held that the appellant's challenge of a
municipal ordinance fixing the water rate did not become moot when the ordinance expired. Id. at
419.
101. S.Pae. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at516.
102. Boise City, 131 F. at 419.
103. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
104. The "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power
to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot." Id. at 632. The voluntary
cessation exception prevents a defendant who has ceased the challenged activity from resuming the
activity once the case is dismissed as moot. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Co., 393
U.S. 199, 202-03 (1968).
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mootness conclusion."' 0 5 The federal government brought suit against
the director of W.T. Grant Company, who was also the director of three
other corporations, for violations of the Clayton Act. 106 Because the case
was the first opportunity for the Court to consider the Clayton Act's
prohibition of interlocking corporate directors, the Court concluded
that
107
there was a public interest in reaching the merits of the case.
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. and W.T. Grant, the Ninth Circuit has considered the
public interest in determining the legality of a challenged action in cases
where it has applied both the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
and voluntary cessation exceptions. 10 8 After holding that the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading review exception applied in Miller, the court
stated that "the public interest weighs heavily in favor of our resolving
this appeal."' 0 9 The court reasoned that it was important for both the
NLRB and employers to know what criteria courts would apply in
reviewing preliminary injunctions issued by the NLRB." 0
In Armster v. United States District Courtfor the Central District of
California (Armster 11),"' the Ninth Circuit considered the public
interest in settling the constitutionality of suspending federal civil jury
trials.11 2 The Armster II decision followed the court's earlier decision in
Armster v. United States District Court for the Central District of
3 that such suspension was unconstitutional." 1 4 In
California(Armster )11
105. W.T Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632.
106. Id. at 630.
107. See id. at 632.
108. See Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 939
(9th Cir. 1987) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception and citing W.T
Grant in support of the proposition that public interest weighs against mootness); Arnster v. United
States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1360 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the
voluntary cessation exception and citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co., Boise City, and W T. Grant
in support of the proposition that there is a strong public interest when the court decides important
precedential issues); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading review exception and citing W.T. Grant for the proposition that a
strong public interest weighs against mootness).
109. Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also considered a public interest in a wide variety of legal issues.
See, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (considering the
public interest in pollock fishing in the Gulf of Alaska); Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n, 829 F.2d at
939 (considering the public interest in Native American hunting of migratory birds); Olagues, 797
F.2d at 1517 (considering the public interest in alleged voter rights violations).
111.
806 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
112. See id.
at 1360-61.
113. 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986).
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June 1986, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts sent a
memorandum to all district judges suggesting that they suspend civil
jury trials until September 30, 1986 in response to a federal budget
shortfall." 5 The Armster I petitioners sought writs of mandamus from
the Ninth Circuit requiring district judges who followed the memo's
suggestion to impanel juries and proceed with civil trials. 1 6 The Armster
I court held that suspending civil jury trials in response to a budget
shortfall violated the Seventh Amendment." 7
On the same day that the Armster I court released its decision,
Congress approved a supplemental appropriations bill that eliminated the
budget shortfall. 18 The Administrative Office subsequently rescinded its
recommendation to suspend civil jury trials. 1 9 Based on that rescission,
the Justice Department filed a motion to vacate the Armster I decision
for mootness, which was addressed by the Ninth Circuit court in Armster
12
1. 0 The Armster II court rejected the Justice Department's motion for
three reasons. 121 First, the court's holding in Armster I addressed the
district judges' suspension of jury trials and not the Administrative
Office's recommendation.122 Consequently, rescission of that
recommendation was not a "sufficient basis for mooting [the] decision
12 3
regarding the constitutional obligation of the... district courts.'
Second, at the time the Armster I court rendered its decision, it had
before it a case or controversy meeting the Article III justiciability
requirements. 124 An appellate court is not required to dismiss a case as
moot based on events that occur after it has rendered its final
judgment. 125 Third, the voluntary cessation exception to mootness
114. Id. at 1425.
115. Id. at 1424.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1425. The Armster I court declined to issue the writs of mandamus choosing instead to
rely on the district judges to voluntarily reinstate jury trials. Id. at 143 1.
118. Armster v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1986) (finding that Congress approved the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, H.R. 4515, on
June 26, 1986); Armster, 792 F.2d at 1423 (submitting decision on June 26, 1986).
119. Armster, 806 F.2d at 1350.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1353.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 1354.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1355. Appellate courts do have discretion to vacate earlier decisions, but the Armster H
court noted no reason to exercise that discretion. Id. at 1355-57.
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prevented the case from being moot.126 The court held that each of these

three grounds was alone sufficient to require it to deny the Justice
Department's motion. 127
After applying the voluntary cessation exception, the Armster II court
reasoned that the strong public interest in determining the
constitutionality of suspending jury trials further weighed against
mootness.128 The court stated that the Ninth Circuit "has long held that
there is a strong public interest in the court's resolving important
precedential issues, a public interest that militates against a finding of
mootness in cases presenting such issues."' 129 The court also concluded
that "[c]learly, the 'flexible character of the [Article] III mootness
doctrine' encompasses consideration of the
public interest in
' 30
safeguarding fundamental constitutional rights."'
In sum, the mootness doctrine recognizes an exception for cases
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review. The exception is applicable
where a challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated
and when there is a reasonable expectation that the complaining party
will be subjected to the same action in the future. Neither U.S. Supreme
Court nor Ninth Circuit decisions applying the exception require that
there be a demonstrated probability that the challenged action will recur.
However, no reasonable expectation exists when the recurrence of the
challenged action is "highly unlikely" or "speculative." Both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have bolstered the application of
exceptions to mootness with considerations of the public interest in
settling the legality of a challenged action.
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD FOSTER V. CARSON MOOT AND
THE CAPABLE-OF-REPETITION-YET-EVADING-REVIEW
EXCEPTION INAPPLICABLE

In response to a severe state budget crisis, the chief justice of the
Oregon Supreme Court, acting as the administrative head of the state

126. Id. at 1357.

127. Id. at 1353. When there are two or more grounds on which an appellate court may rest its
decision and the court adopts all of those grounds, each of those grounds is the judgment of the
court and of equal validity with the other grounds. United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S.
472, 486 (1924). None of the grounds are considered dicta. Id.
128. Armster, 806 F.2d at 1360.

129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980)).
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judiciary, issued the Budget Reduction Plan (BRP) that suspended
appointments of indigent defense counsel between March 1 and June 30,
2003.131 In Foster v. Carson, the plaintiffs brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of the suspension. 132 Before the Ninth Circuit heard the
case, the BRP had expired. 133 The Ninth Circuit held that the expiration
of the BRP mooted the case and rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the
134
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception applied.
A.

In Foster, the Plaintiffs Challenged the Oregon ChiefJustice's
Suspension of Indigent Defense Counsel Appointments

The BRP issued by the chief justice cut off funding for the
35
appointment of indigent defense counsel for nine non-violent offenses. ,
In response to the BRP, Metropolitan Public Defender Services, Inc.,
Public Defender Services of Lane County, the District Attorney for Lane
County, and several indigent defendants brought suit in state court.136
After the state court dismissed the action, the plaintiffs sued the chief
justice in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, 137 alleging
that the BRP violated their rights under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 138 The plaintiffs requested that the district court declare
that the suspension of funding was unconstitutional and void. 139 The
district court held that all plaintiffs had standing but dismissed the case

131. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2003).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 745.
134. Id. at 745-48.
135. Id. at 744. Offenses included certain misdemeanors, misdemeanor probation violations, adult
property and drug felonies, and adult controlled substance possession felonies. Id. The BRP also
closed all offices of the Oregon courts on Fridays. Foster, 347 F.3d at 744. At the initial court
appearance, affected cases were to be rescheduled for a court appearance in the next budget period,
which began on July 1, 2003. Id.
136. Id. at 745.
137. Id. at 742. The defendants also included the state court administrator and several Oregon
judges. Id.
138. Id. at 745.
139. Id. at 746. The plaintiffs also sought costs and fees and any other relief that the court deemed
appropriate. Id.
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on Younger abstention grounds. 140 Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit. 141

B.

The Foster CourtHeld That the Case Was Moot

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Foster case was moot. 142 By
the time the court heard the case, the chief justice had allowed the BRP
to expire, and the Oregon State Legislature had passed a new state
budget that removed the short-term need to suspend funds for indigent
defense counsel. 143 With this funding restored, the Foster court
concluded that it could neither provide any additional relief to the
plaintiffs 44nor undo the harm caused by the delay in the appointment of
counsel. 1
C.

The Foster Court Also Held That the Capable-of-Repetition-yetEvading-Review Exception Did Not Apply

The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that capable-of-repetitionyet-evading-review exception applied to the case. 145 The court agreed
that because the parties had made all possible efforts to expeditiously
litigate the case before the BRP expired, the BRP was too short in
duration to be fully litigated before it ceased. 146 However, the court held
that the plaintiffs had not established a reasonable expectation that
the
47
chief justice would again cut funding for indigent defense counsel.1
The Foster court held that the Armster H decision provided neither
controlling nor persuasive authority for applying the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception. 148 In so holding, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' use of the Armster II case as "authority for finding
that the... exception applies due to the importance of this case.' 49 The
140. Id. at 745. Federal courts will not enjoin enforcement of state law unless the facts
demonstrate that an injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43 (1971).
141. Foster,347 F.3d at 745.
142. Id. at 746.
143. Id. at 745.
144. Id.at 746.
145. Id. at 748-49.
146. Id. at 746.
147. Id. at 748.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 746.
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court distinguished the Armster II decision based on its unique
procedural posture.' 50 After the Armster I case was decided on its merits,
the Justice Department moved for dismissal of the case as moot based on
the developments that occurred post judgment.' 51 The 52
Armster II court
considered the Justice Department's motion to dismiss.'
The Foster court explained that Ninth Circuit precedent did not allow
the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to apply when
the plaintiffs demonstrated only "a mere possibility that something might
happen."'' 53 To support this proposition, the court cited Mayfield and
Dufresne.154 The court noted that Foster presented a more difficult
question of mootness than Dufresne because Oregon's budget crisis,
unlike the Mediterranean fruit fly, had not been eradicated. 55 However,
the court concluded that the prospect of a future funding suspension, like
the possibility of future DNA tests in Mayfield or future pesticide
spraying in Dufresne, depended on "speculative contingencies."' 56 In
Foster, those contingencies included Oregon's economic condition,
indigent defense counsel funding choices made by the legislature,
demand for indigent defense counsel, and the chief justice's reaction to
any budget shortfall. 157 These unknown contingencies, the court
reasoned, outweighed the fact that the chief justice had suspended
funding once before. 58 The court considered that fact to be the only
support for the plaintiffs' argument that the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception saved the case from mootness.159 The court
placed little weight on the plaintiffs' contention that the five special
legislative sessions cutting funds from the 2001-2003 budget after it had
0
been passed indicated that a passed budget did not guarantee funding.16

150. Id. at 747.
151. Armster v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1986).
152. Id.; see alsosupra notes 77-92 and accompanying text.
153. Foster,347 F.3d at 748.
154. Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 748.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Information Introduced by the Foster Plaintiffs in a Supplemental
Brief Suggested that Oregon's Budget Crisis Had Not Ended

The Foster plaintiffs submitted a supplemental memorandum to the
court suggesting that Oregon's budgetary crisis was far from resolved
and establishing that the Oregon legislature anticipated future funding
suspensions for indigent defense counsel. 16 1 The memorandum outlined
events that had occurred subsequent to the expiration of the BRP.162 The
Oregon legislature balanced the 2003-2005 biennial budget by passing a
package of spending and revenue bills that included a controversial
three-year income tax surcharge.' 63 While Foster was before the Ninth
Circuit, voters opposing the income tax surcharge were mounting an
effort to repeal it through a special referendum. 164 In a referendum held
in January 2003, Oregon voters rejected a smaller income tax surcharge
that the legislature had enacted in response to the severe budget
deficit. 165 Anticipating that voters might also reject the surcharge used to
balance the 2003-2005 biennial budget, the legislature included certain
provisions in House Bill 5077166-- one of the bills passed to balance the
budget-that would disappropriate funds to various state agencies in the
event voters repeal the income tax surcharge. 167 Among the agencies

161. See Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 1-4, Foster(Nos. 03-035457 & 03-035458).
162. See id. The facts reported by the plaintiffs in their supplemental memorandum are supported
by media coverage of the Oregon legislature's efforts to balance the budget and the resulting voter
action to repeal the income tax surcharge. See infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
163. Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 5; Janine Har & David Hogan, 227 Days: The
House Wraps Up the 2003-2005 Budget and Decides a Flurry of Other Bills, THE OREGONIAN,
Aug. 28, 2003, at Al.
164. Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 4-5; James Mayer, Antitax Referendum Filing
Starts Clock, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 30, 2003, at El. On February 3, 2004, Oregon voters
overwhelmingly rejected the state legislature's tax surcharge in a statewide referendum. James
Mayer & Dave Hogan, Voters Trounce Tax-Hike Measure, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 2004, at Al.
165. Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 4; James Mayer, Legislature Signs off on Tax
Increase: The Vote: The Stage Is Set for a Budget and Adjournment After the House Accepts a
Three-Year Income Tax Surcharge, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 2003, at Al; see also OR. SEC'Y OF
STATE,

2003

JANUARY

SPECIAL

ELECTION

ONLINE

VOTER'S

GUIDE,

at

http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/jan282003/guide/toc.htm; OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, JANUARY 28,
2003,
SPECIAL
ELECTION:
STATE
MEASURE
NO.
28,
at
I,
available at
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/jan282003/s03abstract.pdf (providing official results of the
special election).
166. H.R. 5077, 72d Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess., 2003 Or. Laws ch. 710.
167. Id. §§ 88-89; Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 5; James Mayer, Senate Approves
Spendingfor Schools, THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 26, 2003, at B 1.
A
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targeted by House Bill 5077 is the Oregon Judicial Department,
which
68
stands to lose $14,414,400 for indigent defense services.'
In sum, the chief justice of the Oregon Supreme Court suspended
funds for the appointment of indigent defense counsel. On appeal, the
Foster court held that the case was moot because the suspension of funds
had been lifted. The court also held that the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception to mootness did not apply because there was
no reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs faced injury from a future
suspension of funds. In a supplemental brief filed with the court, the
Foster plaintiffs presented evidence that Oregon's budget crisis was
ongoing and that the Oregon legislature anticipated voter rejection of a
key income tax surcharge. Without that surcharge, the Oregon Judicial
Department was again at risk of a substantial budget cut.
III.

THE CAPABLE-OF-REPETITION-YET-EVADING-REVIEW
EXCEPTION PREVENTED FOSTER FROM BEING MOOT

Under both U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, there
was a reasonable expectation in Foster that the chief justice would again
suspend funding for indigent defense counsel. 169 While neither court
imposes a rigid standard for demonstrating that a reasonable expectation
exists, the prevailing Ninth Circuit standard requires that the recurrence
of the injury be more than "highly unlikely" or "speculative."' 7 0 The
facts before the Foster court established a reasonable expectation that
the action would recur; such recurrence was neither "highly unlikely"
nor "speculative.' 7 1 The public interest in the legality of the chief
justice's action further supports application of the capable-of-repetitionyet-evading-review exception.'7 2
A.

The Foster Plaintiffs PresentedFacts Demonstratinga Reasonable
Expectation That the ChiefJustice Would Again Suspend Fundsfor
Indigent Defense Counsel

Neither U.S. Supreme Court nor Ninth Circuit precedent imposes a
stringent standard for establishing a reasonable expectation that an
168. Or. H.R. 5077, § 88; Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 6.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See infra Part III.A.
See supra Part LB-C.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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action will recur.1 73 A party may demonstrate a reasonable expectation
by demonstrating "some indication" of recurrence.1 74 However, the
Ninth Circuit will not apply the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception when the recurrence of the challenged action is "highly
unlikely ' 5 or "speculative." 1 76 As in both Honig and Miller, the facts in
Foster indicated that the challenged action would recur and that such
recurrence was neither "highly unlikely" nor "speculative."' 77 The
Foster court relied on Mayfield and Dufresne as authority for finding
that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception did not
apply. 78 However, unlike Foster, the facts in both Mayfield and
Dufresne demonstrated that the recurrence
of the challenged action was
179
"highly unlikely" and "speculative."
Both the U.S. Supreme Court in Honig and the Ninth Circuit in Miller
held that there was a reasonable expectation that a challenged action
would recur.18 In Honig, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was a
reasonable expectation that California would again violate Smith's rights
under the EHA.181 In order for that to occur, Smith would have to reenroll in a California school, be placed in an environment where his
behavior could not be controlled, act in an aggressive manner caused by
his disability, and be expelled for his behavior. 182 The Court concluded
that this chain of events constituted a reasonable expectation even
though Smith had expressed no intention to re-enroll in a California
school and had less than a year remaining before the EHA no longer
applied to him. 183 Similarly, in Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that there
was a reasonable expectation that CPMC would face a future NLRB

173. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 n.6 (1988); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr.,
19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
174. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. United States Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1999).
175. Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 183 F.3d
949, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1999); Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998).
176. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1995).
177. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
178. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2003).
179. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
180. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322-24 (1988); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr.,
19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
181. Honig, 484 U.S. at 322-24; see also supranotes 46-61 and accompanying text.
182. Honig, 484 U.S. at 320-23.
183. See id. at 322-24.
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unfair labor dispute based on its ongoing reorganization,
large size, and
1 84
collective bargaining agreements with five other unions.
The facts before the Foster court indicated that the chief justice would
again be forced to suspend funding for indigent defense counsel. As part
of the 2003-2005 balanced budget, the Oregon legislature approved an
income tax surcharge as a necessary source of revenue.185 The possibility
that Oregon voters would reject the surcharge was more than merely
speculative-a smaller tax surcharge had been rejected by referendum in
January 2003.186 In response, the Oregon legislature enacted provisions
that would automatically disappropriate funds to state agencies in the
event that Oregon voters repeal the tax surcharge.' 87 These automatic
cuts include $14,414,400 from the budget for indigent defense
services. 18
In Foster, as in Honig and Miller, the facts provided "some
indication" that the challenged action would recur and demonstrated that
such recurrence was neither "highly unlikely" nor "speculative. ' 89 In
Honig and Miller, the recurrence of the challenged action relied on a
series of events not guaranteed to occur.1 90 In both cases, the courts held
that there was a reasonable expectation that the challenged action would
recur and applied the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
exception. 19' The facts in Foster similarly support a conclusion that the
chief justice will again face a funding shortage
requiring a suspension of
1 92
indigent defense counsel appointments.
Unlike in Foster, the recurrence of the challenged action in Mayfield
was "highly unlikely" and "speculative." ' 93 In Mayfield the plaintiffs'
184. Miller, 19 F.3d at 454; see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
188. H.R. 5077, § 88, 72d Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess., 2003 Or. Laws ch. 710, § 88; see also supra
note 168 and accompanying text.
189. Compare Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322-24 (1988) (holding that there was a reasonable
expectation that the plaintiff would re-enroll in a California school, misbehave because of his
disability, and be expelled for that misbehavior) and Miller, 19 F.3d at 454 (holding that it was
likely that a hospital would again take action leading to an NLRB proceeding) with supra notes
185-188 and accompanying text (suggesting that Oregon's ongoing budget crisis will result in a
future suspension of indigent defense counsel appointments).
190. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 322-24; Miller, 19 F.3d at 454.
191. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 322-24; Miller, 19 F.3d at 454.
192. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
193. Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997).
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suit became moot when both marines left active duty. 194 In addition,
because the DOD had changed its DNA sampling program, the marines
would not be subjected to the same program even if they were
recalled.' 95 There was no evidence of a national emergency that would
necessitate military recalls nor was there evidence suggesting that the
plaintiffs, out of all recently discharged members of the Marine Corps,
would be targeted for any such recall. 196 Furthermore, there was no
indication that the DOD intended to revert to the version of its DNA
sampling program challenged in the original suit. 197 In contrast, the facts
presented by the Foster plaintiffs demonstrated that Oregon's budget
crisis would continue and that the198state legislature would again cut
funding to indigent defense counsel.
The facts in Dufresne also demonstrated that the future use of
pesticides was both highly unlikely and speculative. 199 In Dufresne, the
effectiveness of the sterile insects-no live Mediterranean fruit flies had
been found in California since 1995-and the assertion by California
officials that sterile insects would be used to combat any future
infestations removed any reasonable expectation that the state would
again use chemical pesticides. 20 0 As the Foster court acknowledged,
Oregon's budget crisis, unlike the Mediterranean fruit fly, had not been
"eradicated., 20 ' In addition, no Oregon officials asserted that future
suspensions of indigent defense counsel would be unnecessary due to an
improved method of addressing state budget shortfalls. 0 2
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that determining whether a case
has become moot requires a "'highly individualistic ... appraisal of the

194. Id.
195. See id. at 1426.

196. See id. at 1425-26.
197. See id.

198. Compare id. at 1425 (holding that there was no reasonable expectation that marines would
be recalled to active duty) with Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
there was no reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs would again be subjected to a suspension of
indigent defense counsel appointments), and Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum at 1-4,
Foster (Nos. 03-035457 & 03-035458) (providing facts supporting the ongoing nature of Oregon's
budget crisis and the likelihood of future cuts to indigent defense counsel budgets).
199. Dufresne v. Veneman, 114 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1997).
200. See id. at 954-55.
201. Foster, 347 F.3d at 748.
202. See id. at 746-48.
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facts."' 203 As in Honig and Miller, the facts before the Foster court
established a reasonable expectation that the challenged action would
recur. 20 4 Finding a reasonable expectation in Foster is further supported
when the facts in that case are compared with the facts of both the
Mayfield and Dufresne cases.20 5
B.

The Strong Public Interest in Settling the Legality of Suspending
Indigent Defense Counsel Appointments Bolsters Application of the
Capable-of-Repetition-yet-Evading-ReviewException to Foster

Under U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, courts can
weigh the public interest in settling the legality of an issue against
mootness.0 6 The Ninth Circuit may consider the public interest after
finding that either the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review or
voluntary cessation exceptions to mootness applies.20 7 Even though the
Foster court correctly held that the Armster H decision did not provide
authority for applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
exception, 0 8 the Armster H decision provides persuasive authority for
allowing the public interest in judging the constitutionality of indigent
defense counsel suspensions to weigh against mootness. 20 9 Based on
both U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the Foster court
should have allowed the public interest in determining the
constitutionality of suspending indigent defense counsel appointments to
weigh against mootness.21 °

203. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. United States Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1999)
(quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3533 (2d ed. 1984)).
204. See supra notes 163-168, 189-191 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 192.
205. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
206. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal.
Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449,454 (9th Cir. 1994).
207. See Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 939
(9th Cir. 1987) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception and citing W.T.
Grant in support of the proposition that public interest weighs against mootness); Olagues v.
Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1517 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading
review exception and citing W.T. Grant for the proposition that a strong public interest weighs
against mootness).
208. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. See Armster v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347, 1360
(9th Cir. 1986).

210. See infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
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In Armster II, the court denied the Justice Department's motion to
vacate the Armster I decision as moot on three independently sufficient
grounds. 2 11 The court's second ground for denying the motion was the
procedural posture of the case.212 The Justice Department argued that the
Administrative Office's post-judgment rescission of its recommendation
to suspend jury trials rendered the case moot.2 1 3 The court disagreed and
held that it was not required to vacate a judgment as moot based on
events that occurred after it had entered that judgment.2 14 The court went
on to hold that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness provided a
third ground for denying the Justice Department's motion.21 5 After
applying the voluntary cessation exception, the court emphasized that
the Ninth Circuit "has long held that there is a strong public interest in
the court's resolving important precedential issues, a public interest that
militates against a finding of mootness in cases presenting such
*
,,216
issues.
While the Foster court correctly held that the Armster II decision was
neither controlling nor persuasive authority for applying the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review
exception, its holding relied on
inappropriate grounds.217 The Foster court rejected the use of the
Armster H decision as precedent because the case's procedural posture
differed from that of Foster.21 8 However, the Armster 11 court addressed
the case's procedural posture and held that it was one of the three
independent grounds for denying the motion to vacate as moot. 21 9 When
an appellate court relies on several independent grounds in its holding,
each of those grounds is a valid judgment of the court.2 20 Therefore, the
Armster H court's application of the voluntary cessation exception and
the consideration of public interest retain their precedential value even

211.
212.
213.
214.

Armster, 806 F.2d at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1350-51.
Id. at 1354-57.

215. Id. at 1357-61.
216. Id. at 1360.
217. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
218. Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 746-48 (9th Cir. 2003).
219. See Armster, 806 F.2d at 1350.
220. United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); see also supra note 127
and accompanying text.

688

An Exception to Mootness
though the Armster H case had a different procedural posture than the
Foster case. 2
The Armster H court's consideration of the public interest in applying
the voluntary cessation exception does not support applying the capableof-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to Foster based only on the
public interest in determining the constitutionality of the chief justice's
actions. 222 As the U.S. Supreme Court did in W.T. Grant,223 the Armster
11 court held that the public interest weighed against a finding of
mootness after it had already determined that the voluntary cessation
exception applied.224 It did not rely on the public interest alone as
grounds for applying the voluntary cessation exception.225 The Foster
court was correct when it refused to apply the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception based only on the public interest.226
Although the Armster II decision does not support using the public
interest as the sole basis for applying the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception to Foster,227 it does support allowing the
public interest in determining the constitutionality of a challenged action
to weigh against mootness.228 The Armster II court reasoned that it
should avoid precluding judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional
behavior unless it is "abundantly clear" that it is required to do so by the
limitations of the mootness doctrine. 229 The court went on to state that
"[c]learly, the 'flexible character of the [Article] III mootness doctrine'
encompasses consideration of the public interest in safeguarding
fundamental constitutional rights. 2 3 °
The Foster court should have allowed the public interest in
determining the constitutionality of the chief justice's suspension of

221. See Sze v. INS, 153 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Armster 11in applying the
voluntary cessation exception); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1194
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Armster H as authority for the proposition that the voluntariness of cessation
is relevant to determining the likelihood of recurrence).
222. See Armster H, 806 F.2d at 1357-61 (considering the public interest after holding that the
voluntary cessation exception applied).
223. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
224.
225.
226.
227.

Armster, 806 F.2d at 1360.
Id.
See Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2003).
See supra notes 222-226 and accompanying text.

228. Armster, 806 F.2d at 1360-61.
229. Id. at 1360.
230. Id. (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980)).
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indigent defense counsel appointments to weigh against mootness. 231
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized that
the public interest in determining the legality of a challenged action may
232
militate against mootness.
The Ninth Circuit has a long history of
considering the public interest 233 in cases involving both the capablerepetition-yet-evading-review and voluntary cessation exceptions. 234
There is a strong public interest in determining the constitutionality of
suspending indigent defense counsel appointments similar to the public
interest at stake in Armster /.235 Oregon, along with many of her sister
states,236 continues to face a severe budget crisis that threatens the
availability of funds for indigent defense counsel.237 By holding the case
moot, the Foster court avoided deciding whether the Oregon chief
justice's actions were unconstitutional and left him, and officials in other
states, free to restrict indigent defendants' access to counsel in the
future.238 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Boise City, there is "propriety of
deciding some question of law presented which might serve 239
to guide the
municipal body when again called upon to act in the matter.,
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit should have held that the capable-of-repetition-yetevading-review exception applied to Foster. Determining whether a case
is moot depends on an analysis of the facts in each case, and the facts, as

23 1.See infra notes 232-239 and accompanying text.
232. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal.
Pac. Med. Ctr.,
19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
233. See Boise City Irrigation & Land Co. v. Clark, 131 F. 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1904).
234. See Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 939
(9th Cir. 1987) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception and citing WT.
Grant in support of the proposition that public interest weighs against mootness); Olagues v.
Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1517 (9th Cit. 1986) (applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception and citing WT. Grant for the proposition that a strong public interest weighs
against mootness); Armster, 806 F.2d at 1360-61 (applying the voluntary cessation exception and
considering the strong public interest in the constitutionality of suspending jury trials).
235. Compare Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenging the
constitutionality of suspending indigent defense counsel appointments), with Armster, 806 F.2d at
1350 (challenging the constitutionality of suspending the appointment of juries in federal civil
cases).
236. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
238. See Foster, 347 F.3d at 748-49.
239. Boise City Irrigation & Land Co. v. Clark, 131 F. 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1904).

An Exception to Mootness
in Foster, may plausibly support different conclusions. However, when
examined in light of U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit mootness
precedent, the facts in Foster establish a reasonable expectation that the
Oregon chief justice will again suspend the appointment of indigent
defense counsel. Strong opposition to the income tax surcharge from
Oregon voters makes it likely that automatic funding cuts for indigent
defense counsel will be triggered.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that mootness is a more
flexible doctrine than standing and that public interest may weigh
against dismissing a case as moot. Determining the constitutionality of
the chief justice's actions in Foster bolsters the application of the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception. By refusing to
decide the Foster case on its merits, the Ninth Circuit sent a powerful
and dangerous message to cash-strapped state governments and
agencies: short-term suspensions of funding will avoid challenge in
federal courts when they expire before the court hears the case. Nothing
in the Foster decision prevents the Oregon chief justice, or any other
judicial official, from suspending funds for indigent defense counsel
each time the Oregon Judicial Department faces a budget shortfall.
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